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Future Trends Foundation for Strategic Studies and Dialogue,
Friendship Hall, Khartoum

26 July 2008

Chairman Sir Derek Plumbly's Speech to the Future Trends Foundation for Strategic Studies and Dialogue

I would like to start with a word of thanks, and two of apology. The thanks go to Dr. Muhammad Mahjoub Haroun and the Future Trends Foundation for inviting me to speak and suggesting the theme and for the speed and efficiency with which they have pulled together this evening’s event.

I hesitated before accepting the Foundation’s invitation, and the apologies may explain why. First I was uncertain whether to speak in English, with an interpreter, or to have a shot at Arabic and circulate a translation for those who are more comfortable with English. I chose the latter. I apologise both to the majority, who will have the disconcerting experience of having their native language put at risk in the coming half hour; and to the rest of you, who will not I hope feel that you have had a wasted evening. Discussion may be in both languages, with informal translation as needed – which I confess it may be for me, since my past experience has been in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Sudanese colloquial remains a challenge.

Which leads to my second apology. I surprised myself this morning when I realized that I had been in Sudan for five months. The time has passed extraordinarily quickly, and people have been very kind and hospitable. But I am conscious that I was invited to lecture on a subject on which virtually everybody in the room knows more than me. Most of you will have had personal experience of the decades of terrible conflict and years of negotiation which preceded the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Who am I, a resident of only five months standing, and particularly one from a country with such a tangled historical relationship with Sudan, to lecture you on this subject? But the AEC has a very privileged position, and an important role to play, and here I am. Even so this is definitely NOT a lecture. After discussion with the Foundation we settled on "presentation, followed by discussion" – a format I intend to repeat in Juba in the next few weeks.

By way of introduction perhaps I should say a little at this point about the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the AEC. I assume your presence here this evening means that you are already aware of its existence. But I have found that the Commission is not as well known, or as well understood, as it ought to be - even among those who are very interested in the success of the CPA.

The AEC first appears in the Machakos protocol. It is tasked with monitoring the implementation of the CPA. The parties are called upon to work with it in improving the institutions and arrangements created under the agreement and in making the unity of Sudan attractive to the people of the South. It is composed of representatives of the two parties and of governments which supported and witnessed the agreement – Ethiopia, Italy, Kenya, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US. The UN, the African Union, the Arab League and the EU are observers. The Commission meets monthly – and in my time here has also held emergency meetings, to discuss the census and Abyei. In between, in meetings workshop and field visits, working groups pursue issues related to the main strands of the CPA – power sharing, wealth sharing, security and the three areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.

The Chairman has to date been chosen from one of the member states. He is appointed by the Presidency of Sudan. But his task is not to represent his own or any other government. He is independent and impartial. His loyalty is to the CPA, and its effective implementation. The role as I see it is one of monitoring, yes, but also of encouragement and support. Kenya provides the deputy chair and there is a small supporting staff, including - as of October - a permanent presence in Juba.

The AEC is charged in the CPA with submitting a mid term evaluation report by 9 July 2008, precisely three years into the six year interim period provided for in the CPA. The AEC works in a collegial fashion and by consensus - which could be a disadvantage, but can also be a source of strength. In the case of the evaluation you would I think be surprised at how much agreement there was on the draft, right from the outset. Nonetheless we worked on it for three months, and submitted it to the Presidency and member governments and observers on the day before the 9 July deadline

The report analyses the extent of implementation and what has been achieved, and what more needs to be done in the remaining three years if the objectives of the CPA are to be met. It makes recommendations, addressed mainly to the parties jointly but also to the international community. It is available in full on the AEC’s website – www.aec-sudan.org.

What I would like to do this evening is to stimulate a dialogue, based on the report with a broader audience than the AEC normally reaches, first on where things stand at this mid point in the interim period and secondly on the outstanding problems and major challenges ahead, and what needs to be done to meet them. I am conscious of the strength of the current debate in Sudan about national issues. But it seems to me important that questions relating to the CPA and its implementation should be placed squarely at the heart of their debate. My presentation will draw heavily on the evaluation report, together with my personal impressions.

The evaluation’s starting point is that the CPA is an extraordinary achievement. Coming to it from the barren territory of failed attempts over half a century to bring peace to the Middle East one is struck by this, and by the extent to which it has proven resilient over the past three years. Peace between the parties has been sustained. The ceasefire arrangements have for the most part held. The constitutional arrangements and institutions provided for in the agreement – the Government of National Unity, the Government of Southern Sudan, legislative arrangements at different levels – are in place. Oil revenue has been shared (in the case of wealth sharing the evaluation judges the such problems as remain are mostly of transparency and process rather than substance). The disparity in development between North and South remains immense. But you have only to look at the extraordinary economic growth achieved here in the national capital and provinces nearby, and at the transformation in the South which has permitted some 2 million refugees and displaced persons to return, to get an immediate sense of the benefits of the peace.

Nonetheless the report notes that public appreciation is mixed with apprehension. This stems in part from the escalation of conflicts elsewhere in Sudan, particularly Darfur; from the perceived absence of a tangible peace dividend, particularly in the South; and from the fact of delays in, and partial or non implementation of, aspects of the agreement.

The report goes into this in some detail across all four protocol areas. For example, in power sharing it lists the major institutional and legislative steps that have been taken but also notes that the pace has been much slower than intended and that some major building blocks have yet to be put in place. Crucial among these, and now three years overdue, is demarcation of the North South border as it stood on 1-1-1956. In some cases – that of the National Land Commission for example, or the Human Rights Commission –legislation has been drafted but not yet adopted. There has been little if any action on the CPA provision in respect of a programme of national reconciliation.

The most obvious instance of non implementation has however been Abyei. The heavy fighting there in May this year and the displacement of 50,000 citizens was the most serious challenge the CPA has faced since it came into force.

If you stand back a little it is I think possible nevertheless to identify a new momentum in CPA implementation in recent months, following the return of the SPLM to participation in the Government of National Unity in December last year. The census in April/May was an important step forward. The 3rd Sudan Consortium meeting in Oslo, also in May, was a success and brought generous commitments on the part of the international community of support during the remaining three years of the interim period. There has been progress involving the parties and international partners on arrangements for disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants.

Abyei could very easily have derailed this momentum. In fact the parties moved quickly to agree the Abyei Roadmap, with tight deadlines both for the establishment of interim arrangements in the Abyei area and provision for the underlying dispute to be settled through arbitration. Exactly a month after the Roadmap was signed the National Electoral Law was approved.

The Abyei crisis brought out some lessons which are relevant to the challenges which will be faced in the coming three years

The first is the evident danger of leaving problems to fester.

The second is the crucial role of mutual understanding and interaction within the institution of the Presidency. Problems which had proven intractable for months, indeed years, were settled there within days.

A third lesson I drew relates to the useful supporting role the AEC can play in crises of this sort. The AEC put Abyei at the top of its agenda in each of the three monthly meetings it held before the fighting, and drew attention to the risks. It brought the parties together and helped to tease out a way forward afterwards. Deng Alor and Dirderi Mohammad Ahmed, who eventually signed the Roadmap for the SPLM and the NCP respectively in this hall on 14 June, represented the parties at the extraordinary meeting we had on 25 May and again in the visit we made to Abyei, Agok and Muglad on 28 May.

I want now to focus on future challenges. The mid term evaluation report stresses the interlocking nature of the CPA, and how partial or non implementation of one element impacts negatively on others. All elements are important and need to be implemented. But the evaluation picks out five areas in which actions recommended are in the AEC’s view critical if the objectives of the agreement are to be achieved in the remaining three years. I do not want to limit the scope of subsequent discussion but for brevity’s sake I will focus here on these – Abyei, to which I will add some remarks on the Three Areas more generally; border demarcation; security sector reform; elections; and 2011 and beyond.

With regard to Abyei, full implementation of the Road Map is critical. Deadlines have slipped and the sense of urgency needs to be maintained given the volatility of the area and the plight of the displaced, but broadly speaking implementation is on track. A n administrator and a deputy administrator have been appointed. The next step is to put a full administration in place. The coordinators of the AEC Three Areas and security working groups and AEC staff visited Abyei again last week. The task on the ground now is one of building up institutions, including the JIU and the joint police unit, and pressing ahead with reconstruction to permit the return of IDPs. Donors, including AEC members, are anxious to help. I urge the government to work with them to ensure that support is timely and well targeted.

Crucial to success will be the triggering of the interim wealth sharing arrangements provided for in the Road Map, including the allocation of 50% of GoNU and 25% of GoSS receipts from oil fields in the areas under arbitration to a fund for development of the areas along the border. Again, I urge the parties to ensure that arrangements for this fund are put in place without delay.

A final word on Abyei. It was excellent news that the parties agreed to take their differences to arbitration. But arbitration is an uncertain process and there could be a lot to be gained on both sides by continuing to discuss mutually beneficial arrangements for the longer term in respect of Abyei. I encourage the parties to pursue this, in parallel with the arbitration process.

The incorporation of the new fund for development of the border areas in the Abyei Road Map reflects I believe a growing awareness of the risks inherent in lack of attention and resources throughout the Three Areas and the border region. The mid term evaluation notes that, of 735 million dollars judged by the original Joint Assessment Mission in 2005 as being needed for development and reconstruction in the Three Areas, only 38 million has been forthcoming. The evaluation recommends the delivery of quick high impact peace dividends to local communities in the areas.

In Southern Kordofan, and the Nuba mountains especially, security problems, lack of integration and shortage of resources have fuelled tension. There appears to be a sense of anger and neglect which is far removed from the optimism that followed the 2002 ceasefire. The process of popular consultation provided for in the CPA is due to take place next year. The parties have moved in recent weeks to address some of the problems - another welcome sign of renewed momentum. I intend in the AEC to give more attention to these areas in the coming months, including in cooperation with the local AECs established in the two provinces late last year.

The second immediate priority identified in the mid term evaluation is demarcation of the North South border. Further delay in demarcation will prolong uncertainty and tension in disputed areas and impact CPA implementation across a wide range of issues, from redeployment to elections. I am told that the report of the Technical ad hoc Border Committee is close to being ready for submission to the Presidency. It is important that demarcation happens without further delay, in line with the recommendation agreed by the parties in the mid term evaluation.

As demarcation proceeds it will make sense to match what is essentially a technical exercise with a political and economic package, the elements of which are already partially visible - dedicated government funding for the border areas (the Abyei oil fund already mentioned), donor assistance and the promotion of communal and other contacts across the border. The aim should be to ensure that the border is open in every sense of the word – and that the benefits of peace and reconciliation and the final settlement of disputes are obvious to all and contribute positively to making unity attractive.

The third priority area identified in the evaluation as being critical to the CPA’s success is security sector reform. The report addresses a number of elements including redeployment and DDR. I will highlight only one here, the need for effective support for the joint integrated units. The JIUs have important symbolic value as an expression of cooperation between the SAF and the SPLA. They enable the two parties to maintain a shared military presence in strategic areas where lack of trust makes it difficult for either to withdraw completely. In Abyei the new JIU has full responsibility for security in the interim area.

The evaluation report paints a grim picture of the equipment, support and training available to the JIUs generally. It describes units which, though co-located, are rarely genuinely integrated. It speaks of units which lack vehicles and communication systems and proper accommodation and medical support. This is an area where rapid action by the government, UNMIS and donor governments could make an immediate difference. Again the parties recognised the urgency of this in the mid term evaluation. I urge them to move forward swiftly in implementing the report’s recommendation in respect of JIUs.

I suspect a good deal of the subsequent discussion this evening will relate to the next high priority identified in the evaluation, the need for a major focus now on preparations for the elections due next year. The holding of elections by the end of the fourth year of the interim period is a key CPA provision, central to the process of democratic transformation it envisages. Properly conducted elections should help to make unity attractive and ensure broader ownership of the institutions put in place by the peace process.

But if such elections are to take place in 2009 the Electoral Law passed last month must be followed up quickly. Appointment of the National Electoral Commission is now overdue, but reportedly imminent. Its role in subsequent election preparations, from raising awareness to supervising the complex process of country wide electoral legislation, will be crucial. The evaluation underlines that other elements will also need to be put in place and implemented well in advance of the election campaign, including passage of security and media legislation. International support and monitoring arrangements will need to be agreed. All of this suggests a need for early and concerted action, but this will only begin to be possible when the NEC is in place.

The fifth and final priority area identified in the evaluation is the need to begin preparations soon for 2011 and beyond. There are two aspects to this. The first concerns the legislation needed to provide for the referendum which will enable the people of Southern Sudan to exercise their right of self determination. That right, and the referendum itself, lie at the heart of the CPA. But the precise modalities have yet to be addressed, and experience with other major legislation suggests that achieving consensus will be at best time consuming. The National Constitutional Review Commission has done excellent work in many areas already. Work in this one will surely need to begin soon.

The second aspect involves looking beyond 2011. Referenda are by their nature unpredictable. The evaluation stresses the fundamental interdependence of North and South. Neither this, nor the need for peaceful co existence, will change in 2011. It will be important to use the next three years to talk through and develop arrangements across the political and economic and energy and security fields which will obtain and be beneficial whatever the outcome of the referendum.

Before concluding I would like to say a brief word about international support for the CPA. Naivasha brought the international community and the parties together in support of peace. The AEC’s role derives from that partnership. The evaluation suggests that its monitoring role will grow in importance as the major milestones of the second half of the interim period – elections, popular consultation, referenda – approach and decisions are taken on outstanding issues. But it also underlines the importance of broadening international support, beyond the immediate AEC membership. It notes the generous pledges at Oslo in May, 4.8 billion dollars in total, and the importance of aid for capacity building and development in Southern Sudan in particular. It encourages specific donor assistance with regard to elections, DDR and JIUs, and development in the Three Areas and along the border.

The points I would like to bring out here relate first to UNMIS, and second to the climate for international cooperation in the coming period. UNMIS is a very large investment by the international community, the visible manifestation of its commitment on the ground. In the evaluation report, the AEC stresses the importance it attaches to the parties making the fullest possible use of UNMIS’ capabilities. In Abyei and the surrounding areas before the fighting , its movement and access were circumscribed. Such restrictions fly in the face of the parties’ interest in preserving peace. Subsequent improvements in access, not just in the Abyei area but also in Southern Kordofan, need to be sustained and extended. For its part UNMIS needs to be located and staffed in such a way as to give it the best chance of anticipating problems and assisting in defusing them.

Ever since the CPA was signed attention, both international and domestic, has been drawn inevitably to the crisis in Darfur. The need for humanitarian assistance has squeezed the funding available for recovery and development. Nonetheless in the weeks before I took up my post, when I toured capitals, both of AEC members and others, I heard the same message everywhere - that the CPA was the foundation and the essential framework for peace in Sudan. I got a similar message when I first met Sudanese citizens in different walks of life in Khartoum and in Juba. They might grumble about the perceived lack of a peace dividend but they had no doubt about the importance of the CPA.

The centrality of the CPA has not changed as a result of the action taken by the International Criminal Court. But the risk of distraction from the pressing challenges ahead has clearly increased, both here and internationally. Meeting these challenges will be crucial for all of the people of Sudan, as well as for stability in the wider region. To achieve this it is of vital importance that the partnership between the parties and the international community’s engagement with both of them be sustained.

A final thought, derived also from the evaluation........... Recent events in Abyei highlighted the threat non implementation can pose to the stability of the CPA. The backlog of outstanding actions needs to be addressed. But implementation is not just about putting arrangements in place, it is also about the spirit in which it is done, what you might call the spirit of Naivasha. It seems to me symptomatic that some of the CPA provisions which relate most clearly to this, for example a programme of national reconciliation and healing, have not been pursued; or – as in the case of the Commission on the Rights of Non Muslims in the National Capital - have been implemented belatedly and with very limited resources. I am optimistic that the CPA will hold, despite the dangers. B ut if its full objectives are to be met, including that of making unity attractive, every effort needs to be made both to achieve full implementation and to reflect and foster the spirit of the agreement. Building confidence and trust is as important now as in the early days of peace.

End of speech