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African Union Peace and Security Council

28 November 2008

Chairman Sir Derek Plumbly's Statement to the African Union Peace and Security Council

Thank you for inviting me to speak to the PSC, and for scheduling today’s meeting on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The meeting is timely given the scale of the challenges ahead and will I hope serve to underscore the centrality of the CPA to peace in Sudan, and the need for sustained international engagement with the parties in support of it.

I am conscious of my own inexperience when compared to those who will speak after me. But the Assessment and Evaluation Commission is tasked with an important support and monitoring role in the Machakos Protocol, very specifically so at the mid-point in the interim period for CPA implementation which was passed just four months ago. I will try in my remarks to give an overview of the current position and the risks and challenges ahead, drawing on the evaluation the Commission made at that time, and our discussions and my own impressions since.

I started work as chairman of the AEC in March. Since then the Commission has received strong support from the international community in reinforcing the foundations laid by my predecessor, including through the opening of a permanent office in Juba. It helped play a catalyst role in efforts to resolve the crises which occurred in the early summer with regard to the census and Abyei. It committed in the mid-term evaluation to seeking to play a more active role, both in monitoring and in working with the parties to develop ideas and recommendations which can help to improve the arrangements provided for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. I take this opportunity to thank you, and through you the Special Envoy and the African Union delegation in Sudan, for their active and insightful participation in the Commission’s work.

The mid-term evaluation report was submitted to the Presidency on 8 July and published the following day. It addresses the extent of implementation in the first half of the interim period and what more needs to be done in the remaining three years if the objectives of the agreement are to be met. The evaluation was agreed by consensus, including of the parties, which could of course be a limiting factor but should give additional force to the 35 or so specific recommendations for future action contained in it, most of which are directed jointly to them.

The evaluation notes that the CPA has proven resilient over the interim period so far, in the sense that peace has been preserved; the ceasefire has largely held; the institutions of government provided for in it have been created and sustained; revenue from oil produced in the South has been shared; and some 2 million refugees and IDPs have been able to return.

Against that, mistrust has persisted. It has been fed by delays in, and the partial or non-implementation of, aspects of the Agreement - of which the Abyei Protocol was until recently the most glaring example. Key CPA commissions, whose work one might think central to the task of making unity attractive such as the National Civil Service Commission or the Commission on the Rights of Non Muslims in the National Capital, were set up only last year and have only now begun to function, and that with limited resources. Others, such as the Human Rights Commission, have yet to see the light of day. Little or no action has been taken on the programme of national reconciliation and healing provided for in the CPA.

At the time the evaluation was written it was possible nonetheless to discern some new momentum in CPA implementation following resumption by the SPLM of participation in the GoNU in December and reflecting, in part, more intensive engagement between the parties in the institution of the presidency. The census, an important milestone, took place, albeit with reservations in the South. The Oslo Donors’ Conference in May was a success. The fighting in Abyei could very easily have derailed this momentum. In fact the parties moved quickly to agree the Abyei Roadmap, with tight deadlines for establishment of interim arrangements in the area and provision for the underlying dispute to be settled by international arbitration. A month later, as the mid-term evaluation was going to press, the National Electoral Law was adopted. Unfortunately, since the publication of the report, the momentum we discerned at the time has not been sustained. Attention has been elsewhere, and progress has been at best intermittent. In addition, at least one new difference has emerged in respect of handling of foreign exchange reserves.

The evaluation stresses the interlocking nature of the CPA – all elements of it are important and need to be implemented – but it picks out five priority areas in which the action recommended is, in the AEC’s view, critical: Abyei; border demarcation; security sector reform; elections; and the 2011 referendum and beyond.

I would like now to look at the five priority areas identified in the evaluation individually. I will touch also on the situation in Southern Kordofan, which Commission members visited 10 days ago to monitor the security situation, and which outside commentators such as the International Crisis Group have suggested may be “the next Darfur”.

With regard first to Abyei, the immediate priority is to ensure full implementation of the Roadmap. The AEC has stressed the need to sustain a sense of urgency given the fragility of the situation and the plight of the IDPs. Deadlines have slipped but broadly speaking, implementation is on track. The SAF and the SPLA have largely withdrawn, leaving security in the hands of a strengthened JIU and Joint Integrated Police Unit. The interim administration is at last in place. There has been some voluntary return of IDPs. But there is still much to do. The last steps of SAF and SPLA withdrawal, from Diffra and Agok respectively, need to be taken. And the substantive work of reconstruction and reconciliation need to be carried forward vigourously with co-ordinated funding from government and donors. Difficult questions may of course arise when the Permanent Court of Arbitration reaches a decision, and there could in my view be much to be gained by both sides from continued discussion of mutually beneficial agreed arrangements for the longer term to implement the Abyei protocol. I would encourage the parties to pursue this, in parallel with the arbitration process.

As with Abyei, a return to violence in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains would constitute a serious threat to the CPA. During our visit we were made very aware of the anger felt by many in the former SPLA controlled areas, and indeed others, including in majority Misseriya areas, at what is seen as neglect since the CPA was signed in 2005. Power sharing has been tortuous, and aid and Government funding woefully inadequate. There were differing assessments of the trend in security incidents – UNMIS and the state government report a decline – but all agreed that the state is awash with arms and the risk of violence real. Against that, there has been positive movement in the past four months in the shape of security agreements which have resulted in the opening of the formerly SPLA controlled areas, redeployment south by the SPLA units concerned, and moves to absorb and integrate the former SPLM/SPLA police and civil service. It is vital that these developments be built upon and backed by generous government funding and donor assistance in support of integration if security and stability in the state are to be achieved.

The second priority identified in the mid-term evaluation is demarcation of the North/South border, which is now more than three years overdue. We have been told repeatedly since the evaluation was completed that the report of the technical committee which has been working on this is ready for submission to the Presidency. The parties may have more to say on the state of play today. But it is clear that work will be needed in the Presidency both on presentation – to ensure that demarcation is understood as disadvantaging nobody, and that the border is open in every sense of the word – and to clear up remaining points of difference between the parties. Further delay in demarcation will prolong uncertainty and tension in disputed areas and impact CPA implementation across a wide range of issues, from redeployment to elections.

The fighting in Abyei in May demonstrated the risk to the CPA, both from frictions in areas close to the border and from leaving disputes to fester unresolved. On the other hand the Abyei Roadmap, and the Unity Fund established in accordance with it, provide both a precedent and a resource for the resolution of uncertainty in the border areas.

The third priority on which the evaluation laid emphasis, and which the AEC has been following closely since, relates to the security relationship between the parties. The persistence of mistrust between them is reflected in high defence expenditure and the concentration of forces in border areas. The mid term evaluation however focused on two aspects, Joint Integrated Units and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. The issue with regard to the first was that JIUs remain starved of equipment, transport, shelter, healthcare and training and are neither joint nor integrated in reality. Some progress has been achieved at least with regard to provision of support for them, including from donors. Ultimately however what is needed is a change of attitude and approach from the authorities with regard to JIUs.

On DDR, it has seemed in recent months that the pieces are falling into place for the major programme envisaged in the CPA. Ultimately some 180,000 personnel should benefit. Wisely the UN and the two DDR commissions have chosen to proceed in stages, starting with pilot projects in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan. These pilot projects are crucial for stability in the two areas. The AEC has been working to encourage donor support and I am therefore concerned that difficulties have now been raised by one of the parties with regard to previously agreed modalities for the programme. It is important that these be resolved without delay to enable the programme to proceed.

Successful handling of these first three priorities – Abyei and Southern Kordofan; border demarcation; and security relations – is essential if the CPA is to be kept on course and a return to violence avoided. Getting the remaining two – elections and preparations for 2011 – right will determine the future of Sudan. The mid-term evaluation recommended, as a particularly urgent priority, a major and immediate focus on preparations for the elections due in 2009, starting with establishment of the National Electoral Commission. Under the CPA, the constitution and the electoral law, elections should be held before July 2009. Taking the rainy season into account this could mean their having to be held in the next 4-5 months. The National Electoral Commission, however, has still to start work, though the National Assembly last week agreed its composition. None of the other essential preparations have yet been made. These include on the practical side staffing the NEC, preparing a new electoral register on the basis of the census results still to be announced and drawing up constituency boundaries, including on the basis of a north/south border which has yet to be demarcated. Necessary preparations identified in the evaluation also include adoption of enabling legislation – for example in respect of security and the press and media – so as to ensure the free and fair environment for elections envisaged in the CPA.

Successful elections are central to the democratic transformation envisaged in the CPA. Free and fair ones offer the best prospect of making unity attractive. Such elections need to be properly prepared. At the AEC’s last meeting members agreed on the need to encourage the parties to act urgently, to take the necessary preparatory steps for elections, and to stand ready – once the NEC is in place – to review feasible dates which will permit such steps to be taken in advance of the elections.

The fifth and final priority area to which I would like to draw attention is the need to begin now to prepare for 2011. The CPA envisaged passage in the third year of the interim period of the legislation needed to make arrangements for the referendum which will enable the people of Southern Sudan to exercise their right of self determination. This deadline has not been met. The right, and the referendum itself, lie at the heart of the CPA. The evaluation noted that experience with other major pieces of legislation suggested that achieving consensus might be time consuming. It is therefore doubly important that work on it begin without delay.

There is a second aspect to this. The AEC’s concern is to make unity attractive, but anybody who has had the chance to engage with Southern opinion will know that the possibility of secession is real. Equally however the fundamental interdependence of North and South is self evident, as is the need for both to work together in peace. I can do no better than repeat here the message in the mid-term evaluation as regards the importance of using the remainder of the interim period to develop links and arrangements across the political, economic, energy and security fields which look beyond 2011 and will hold whatever the outcome of the referendum.

Two final thoughts...... The first concerns the importance of the parties working together in a way which reflects not just the letter but the spirit of the CPA. Therein lies the best chance of dispelling mistrust, building confidence and ensuring the achievement of the objectives of the Agreement.

The second relates to the ongoing centrality of the CPA to Sudan and the risk of distraction from the challenges I have outlined as a result of other factors - the continuing crisis in Darfur of course, but also now the action under consideration by the International Criminal Court. Whatever happens on these issues, it is crucial that the international community retains its ability to engage with both parties and sustain its support for the CPA through the remainder of the interim period and beyond.

The African Union’s voice carries particular authority in Sudan. It has bourn and is bearing a heavy burden with regard to Darfur, but in present circumstances it is vital that its voice also be heard in encouraging the parties to work together and implement the CPA. The time left to address the backlog of uncompleted actions and the remaining challenges I have outlined is shortening.

End of speech