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National Assembly, Khartoum

5 August 2010

Chairman Sir Derek Plumbly's Statement at the National Assembly - Evaluation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

NOTE: Click here to access the Arabic translation of this speech.

Thank you for inviting me to speak in these august surroundings at a critical moment in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and indeed in the history of Sudan, as preparations for the self-determination referendum in the South are getting underway. It is a great honor to do so.

I am very conscious of the depth of experience in the audience concerning the issues on which I will be speaking. My own knowledge derives only from the two and a half years I have spent in Sudan as the independent chair of the AEC, the commission charged in the Machakos Protocol with monitoring and supporting implementation of the Agreement. The commission meets monthly with working group meetings in between. It frequently conducts field visits – one working group will for example be going to Southern Kordofan and Abyei next week.

As you probably know the AEC – the members of which include the two parties - produced a mid-term evaluation of CPA implementation in July 2008. A further full report was completed at the three quarters point, in January this year. Both were published and are available on our website. Additionally comprehensive minutes and reports are agreed after each meeting or visit. I will draw on these reports in my remarks today as well as on my own personal impressions.

The Speaker suggested as a title for my remarks “Evaluation of the CPA”. I will try to offer a brief assessment of what has been achieved to date and where matters stand, as well as looking at the challenges ahead and what remains to be done if the key outstanding steps in CPA implementation are to be completed and its core objectives met.

But let us first recall the scale of the achievement to date. For five and a half years, peace has been sustained. The ceasefire has for the most part held. The constitutional arrangements and institutions provided for in the agreement have been put in place. Wealth sharing arrangements, in respect of oil revenue in particular, have been implemented in accordance with the Agreement.

All of this represents a very major achievement. The CPA partners deserve to be congratulated on it. The people of Sudan have benefited immensely. The Agreement has contributed to the impressive economic growth visible in many parts of the country. In the South autonomous institutions have taken root and some 2 million people have returned to their homes.

Against this, numerous provisions of the CPA have been implemented partially, or belatedly, or - in one or two cases - not at all. Demarcation of the North-South border is one obvious example, where, five years after the date set for completion, a great deal remains to be done. Commissions such as that on the Rights of Non-Muslims in the National Capital and the Civil Service Commission were just beginning work when we wrote the mid-term evaluation, and their impact has been limited. The program of national reconciliation and healing provided for in the Agreement never got under way. The inevitable effect has been to feed mistrust which already existed after decades of civil war.

Eleven months now remain to the end of the Interim Period provided for in the CPA. There is no flexibility in this timeline and no road map for what happens after it. By my calculations only 157 days remain to the January date set in the CPA, and the law passed by the National Assembly in December last year, for the referendum of the people of the South.

Recent months have seen significant advances. The peaceful conduct of the national elections in April marked a critical milestone in CPA implementation. Appointment of the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission in June was an essential first step in preparation for the self determination referendum. And the engagement of the African Union High Level Implementation Panel has given a new dimension to international support for the CPA and has helped generate momentum, most obviously in relation to the negotiations on post-referendum arrangements which were launched here in Khartoum last month.

The AEC’s January 2010 report emphasized the need to prioritize the remaining challenges in CPA implementation, and I would like now to look in rather greater detail at where we presently stand in relation to the priorities it identified.

First the self-determination referendum…first because of the organizational challenges it presents; and because of the central role the promise of self-determination played in securing the peace which I believe - from my experience over the past two and a half years - everybody in this country is concerned to deepen and preserve.

The AEC’s January report emphasized the need for the referendum to be well prepared and such as to convince those voting that it has been free and fair and that their choice – whatever it may be – will be respected by all. Both parties have stressed the importance of integrated UN support for the referendum in ensuring that this standard is met. They have also encouraged the idea of a UN role in monitoring it, in addition to international and domestic observers. The UN has I believe undertaken a good deal of contingency planning for the referendum, as have the donors who are likely to be called upon to help with funding for it. The Southern Sudan Referendum Commission has begun work. But concrete activity cannot begin until the commission is staffed and able to define what help it needs, for example in respect of its budget. It is going to face other challenges - in interpreting the law and adjusting its requirements to an increasingly tight timetable, for example, and in ensuring a fair environment in which both viewpoints can be freely argued. It is vital that organizational problems be resolved without delay so as to enable it to get to work fully in Khartoum as well as in Juba.

The Abyei referendum is timed in the CPA to coincide precisely with that of the people of the South, and it is therefore a matter of real concern that the Abyei Referendum Commission has not yet been appointed. The lack of forward movement on Abyei, despite the PCA ruling last year, is contributing to increased insecurity there. It is clear that any solution to the problems of the area must address broader issues including security and individual and community rights in a satisfactory way. When this is done, the key point of contention remaining in relation to the referendum – that of eligibility to vote – should hopefully become more tractable. In the meantime the referendum commission should be appointed so that the necessary logistic and other preparatory steps can be initiated.

The picture is I think brighter with regard to the popular consultation process in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. The AEC held a special session two weeks ago which was attended by the leadership of both states, by the local AECs and by NGOs which have been helping in outreach there. We were all impressed by what we heard about preparations; by the evident seriousness with which the process is being taken locally; and by the quality of the partnership between the parties in both states. There are major steps ahead, including the elections in Southern Kordofan, but this process is I believe on track.

I am not sure that the same can be said in the case of North-South border demarcation. In all of its reports the AEC has stressed the urgency of this.It has not suggested that further steps in CPA implementation are conditional on border demarcation. But it has warned of the risks attendant on failure to resolve the outstanding issues, or to demarcate the border fully on the ground. The parties have now formed another committee to confirm, in the first place, which areas precisely along the border are disagreed. Action at the political level to resolve these outstanding questions without further delay, in addition to continuing technical work to survey and demarcate the line on the ground, is clearly now of the utmost importance.

Finally among the priority areas identified in our last published report, I should mention security, where the picture since January has been mixed. The latest report of the UN Secretary General details tensions in border areas; post-election fighting in Jonglei and Upper Nile; and restrictions on UNMIS freedom of movement. DDR, a CPA flagship program, has made slow progress at best. There has been no advance - so far as I am aware - on the issue of SPLA redeployment. And any major issues related to the JIUs will I imagine increasingly be subsumed in the discussions of the security cluster on post-referendum arrangements.

You could be forgiven for thinking, on the basis of what I have said so far, that the picture as a whole is a gloomy one. That is not my intention. There are clearly causes for concern. But what needs to be done on all of the issues I have mentioned is pretty clear. I have no doubt that the remaining challenges of CPA implementation can be met in the final year of the Interim Period, and peace in Sudan strengthened and deepened as a result. I am convinced that this can be done. Indeed when asked by one of your members, Ustaz Ahmed Abdel Rahman, to talk next week on the subject to the Federation of Friendship Associations I stole a phrase from President Obama “Yes, we can” as the title.

Why am I confident? First because - as I said earlier - I believe that nobody in Sudan wants to see a return to conflict. Secondly because I have been impressed over my period here by the ability of the two parties to problems in line with the CPA. But also because I am struck - and this is my main point - by the extent to which mutual self-interest and interdependence point in the positive direction. This is clearly very relevant to the talks which are just beginning on post referendum arrangements. The AEC first drew attention to their importance in ensuring a peaceful transition, what ever the result of the referendum, in the mid term evaluation and suggested that the interdependence of north and south should be taken as the starting point. This is most obvious in, but certainly not confined to, the economic sector where continued matching of resources and capabilities will maximize benefits for all.

I was present in Aweil last month at the second conference of the ten border states. The clear message from that meeting, and from its predecessor in Kadugli in February, was one of the need to strengthen and protect “tamazuj”, intermingling, between communities on both sides of the border. Peace and development in these states which account for 30% of the population in Sudan will continue to depend significantly on open borders, community rights, the free movement of goods and people and joint security arrangements - whatever the results of the referenda, or indeed of discussions on border demarcation.

That message will I hope be heard by those engaged in the coming weeks in negotiating post-referendum arrangements on both scenarios, unity or secession. Obviously interdependence will be most completely protected if the people of the South can be freely persuaded that unity is the attractive option. Hopefully from the talks, and from the wider debate now under way, ideas for enhancing unity in the future will emerge. But the need to protect shared economic interests and individual and community rights, and to put in place effective joint security arrangements, will not be any the less if the people of the South vote for secession. And indeed if they do, it seems to me self-evident that there will be a continuing need for a framework of cooperation across the various levels of government to manage the many and varied shared interests of, and continuing relations between, North and South.

The Guiding Principles for the post-referendum negotiations which were agreed in Juba on 20 July constitute an excellent starting point. That document received too little attention in the media. In it the parties agreed to base “all post-referendum arrangements in the spirit of the CPA”. It records their belief in “enhanced cooperation among the people of Sudan whatever the decision of the people of the South”; and their desire to work together for peaceful co-existence and “to promote and protect the sustainable livelihoods and welfare of the people”.

We can discuss where this might lead in relation to the specific negotiating clusters – citizenship, economic and natural resources, security and legal affairs. But in the end these negotiations, though facilitated by the African Union High Level Implementation Panel, are a Sudanese process - for the parties in the first instance but they have recognized in the Memorandum of Understanding agreed in Mekelle, Ethiopia, the need also to involve the public more widely. The AEC staff have been identified by the parties as a source of administrative support, and our members – notably Norway in respect of oil issues – stand ready to offer expertise when required.

President Mbeki spoke eloquently at the launch of the post-referendum negotiations on 10 July of the links that bind north and south, and the trend across Africa for greater integration. The choice is for the people of the south, and their decision must be respected. But there is no reason why the result, whatever it may be, should not cement peace, strengthen coexistence, and promote mutually beneficial development together for all the people of Sudan. And, once again as President Mbeki put it in his speech, a strong and confident Sudan, whether as one state or two, will prove to be one of the cornerstones of Africa’s progress in the twenty first century.

In pursuing this vision Sudan will have the strong support of the international community. But success ultimately will depend on the people of Sudan, on their elected governments and representatives at all levels, and very specifically on the two parties. In comparison to earlier phases in CPA implementation it will require accelerated effort, an enhanced intensity of engagement and a renewed spirit of accommodation. But the prize is a precious one, and it can be done.

End of speech